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 NOTE 
Consent Not Required: Missouri’s Adoption 
Laws for Incapacitated Adults 
DeBrodie v. Martin, 400 S.W.3d 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
KELLY COLLINS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, approximately 640,000 children spent time in foster care.1  
Mentally incapacitated children in foster care are considered “hard to place” 
and are often placed in an institutional setting.2  When families petition for 
the adoption of these children, the court has to have permission from certain 
parties to the adoption, one of whom is the adoptee.3  The adoptee’s consent 
to the adoption is generally easily obtained, and courts, upon deciding the 
adoption is in the child’s best interests, will grant the adoption without issue.4 
But what if the adoptee has been found to be legally incapable of giving 
consent?  Does that mean that an incompetent adoptee cannot be adopted?  
That is the issue in a recent case from the Missouri Court of Appeals, West-
ern District: DeBrodie v. Martin.  The court held that mentally incapacitated 
adults are not required to give consent to their adoption.5  Since consent is not 
a necessary prerequisite, the circuit court can evaluate the fitness and proprie-
ty of the petitioning adoptive parents and determine whether the adoption is 
in the child’s best interests.6 
This Note discusses Missouri’s adoption statutes, specifically adult 
adoptions and adoptions of mentally incapacitated adults, then explains the 
best interests of the child determination that courts perform when granting (or 
denying) a petition for adoption.  Part II gives a brief background of the facts 
 
* B.S. Business Administration – Management, University of Missouri, 2012; J.D. 
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2015.  I am grateful to Professors 
Melody Daily and Mary Beck for their assistance in developing my legal writing 
skills and for their guidance during the writing and editing process of this Note.  I 
would also like to thank my family for their love and support in all of my endeavors.  
 1. Foster Care, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, http://www.childrensrights.org/newsroom/
fact-sheets/foster-care/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 2. Suzanne Daley, Disabled Foster-Care Youths Kept in New York Hospitals, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/11/nyregion/disabled-
foster-care-youths-kept-in-new-york-hospitals.html. 
 3. See DeBrodie v. Martin, 400 S.W.3d 881, 887-88 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 4. See MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030.1-.2 (Supp. 2014). 
 5. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 889. 
 6. See id. 
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and circumstances surrounding DeBrodie v. Martin.7  Part III discusses the 
history of Missouri’s adoption statutes, focusing on adult adoptions, and ex-
plains the best interests of the child analysis in custody proceedings.8  Part IV 
delves into the initial Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision.9  Finally, Part V 
comments on the outcome upon remand and re-appeal of the case, and why 
both the circuit court and appellate court ultimately reached the incorrect 
decision and deprived DeBrodie of the chance to be a member of a loving, 
adopted family.10 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In August 2011, Bryan and Mary Martin (hereinafter “the Martins”) 
filed a petition to adopt twenty-five-year-old Carl Lee DeBrodie (hereinafter 
“DeBrodie”).11  DeBrodie was an incapacitated and disabled adult, and Mary 
Martin was formerly his legal guardian.12  The Martins filed their petition in 
the Circuit Court of Cole County, Juvenile Division.13 
In September 1999, Mary Martin had been appointed by the Circuit 
Court of Cole County to be the legal guardian of DeBrodie.14  DeBrodie was 
thirteen years old at the time and was considered to be a special needs child.15  
In the guardianship judgment, the Cole County Circuit Court found that 
DeBrodie’s biological mother and biological father were “unable or unfit to 
assume the duties of guardianship.”16  The court determined that DeBrodie’s 
biological mother was “severely, intellectually, psychologically, socially and 
occupationally impaired.”17  In the guardianship judgment, the court found 
that there were sufficient grounds to terminate DeBrodie’s mother’s parental 
rights, but the court did not terminate her parental rights.18  The court deter-
mined that termination of parental rights was “not . . . in the child[]’s best 
interest.”19 
Until DeBrodie was eighteen years old,20 Mary Martin continued to 
serve as his legal guardian.21  After DeBrodie turned eighteen, the Callaway 
 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part V. 
 11. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d. at 883. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 883 n.1. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Around 2004, DeBrodie would have turned eighteen years old.  See id. at 
883. 
 21. See id. 
2
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County Circuit Court adjudged him as an incapacitated and disabled adult.22  
With this status, DeBrodie became a ward of the Public Administrator of 
Callaway County, Karen Digh Allen.23  Ms. Allen (hereinafter the “Legal 
Guardian”) was appointed by the court to be DeBrodie’s legal guardian and 
conservator.24  Beginning in 2010, and at the time of both proceedings de-
tailed in this Note, DeBrodie lived at Second Chance, an institutionalized 
group home.25 
In the Martins’ 2011 adoption petition, they alleged that after they were 
no longer DeBrodie’s guardians they continued to provide DeBrodie with 
care and support.26  The Martins’ petition also stated that “they had developed 
a ‘close familial relationship’ with DeBrodie that was important to his wel-
fare and [that] they wanted to establish a legal familial relationship by adopt-
ing him.”27  The Legal Guardian filed an objection to the Martins’ adoption 
petition.28 
Because DeBrodie was found to be an incapacitated and disabled adult, 
he was presumed to be incompetent to consent to the adoption.29  Section 
453.030 of the Missouri Revised Statutes requires the adoptee to consent to 
his or her adoption.30  This section provides an exception to the consent re-
quirement if the court determines the child does not have the mental capacity 
to consent.31  The Martins claimed that if the court were to determine that 
DeBrodie was competent to consent, DeBrodie would consent to the adoption 
of himself by the Martins.32  The Martins alleged that, if the court found 
DeBrodie was incompetent to consent, neither his consent nor the Legal 
Guardian’s consent was necessary for the court to grant the adoption.33 
The Legal Guardian requested the court appoint a guardian ad litem to 
represent DeBrodie’s interests in the adoption proceeding and the court 
granted that request.34  The guardian ad litem, after performing an investiga-
tion, recommended that the court grant the Martins’ adoption petition.35 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. In re Adoption of DeBrodie, No. WD 77236, 2014 WL 5462289, at *5 (Mo. 
Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2014), reh’g and/or transfer denied (Nov. 25, 2014), transfer de-
nied (Feb. 3, 2015). 
 26. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d. at 883. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  The Martins acknowledged this presumption.  Id. 
 30. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030.2 (Supp. 2014). 
 31. Id. 
 32. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 883. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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The court held an evidentiary hearing and then entered its judgment.36  
The court stated that it did not doubt that the Martins loved DeBrodie and 
wanted what was best for him, but nevertheless, the court denied the Martins’ 
adult adoption petition.37  The court found that DeBrodie’s consent to adop-
tion was required by Section 453.030.2 because DeBrodie was twenty-five at 
the time the adoption petition was filed and was therefore over the fourteen 
years of age requirement in the statute.38  The exception to the consent re-
quirement did not apply to DeBrodie because he was not a “child” within the 
statute’s definition.39  Because DeBrodie was legally incapacitated, he could 
not give his own consent, and the court found insufficient evidence to support 
a finding that DeBrodie could understand the legal significance of consenting 
to the adoption.40 
The Legal Guardian could not consent to DeBrodie’s adoption either.41  
The probate court had not authorized her to consent to the adoption and she 
did not try to get the authority from the probate court to do so.42  The court 
did take the guardian ad litem’s recommendation of granting the adoption 
into account, but found that the court did not have the authority to disregard 
the Legal Guardian’s decision.43  Ultimately, the court stated that because 
“there was no consent from DeBrodie or [the] Legal Guardian,” it could not 
“consider the fitness and propriety of the proposed adult adoption.”44 
The Martins filed a post-trial motion and alleged that the court erred in 
finding that the adoption required consent from either DeBrodie or the Legal 
Guardian.45  The court denied the Martins’ post-trial motion,46 and the Mar-
tins appealed.47 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Missouri’s Adoption Code 
Like adoptions of minors, adult adoptions create a legally recognized 
familial relationship.48  In Missouri, Section 453.030 states that written con-
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.at 883-84. 
 38. Id. at 883 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030.2 (Supp. 2012) (stating that 
written consent is required if the adoptee is fourteen years of age or older)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 883-84. 
 41. Id. at 884. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Mandi Rae Urban, The History of Adult Adoption in California, 11 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 612, 612 (2000). 
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sent of the person to be adopted is required if the adoptee is fourteen years of 
age or older.49  The section further states that the consent of the adoptee is not 
required if the court finds that such child does not have sufficient mental ca-
pacity to give his or her consent.50  The statute does not clarify whether an 
adult who is mentally incapable of giving consent can be included in the ex-
ception to the consent requirement for an adoption. 
The adoption code sets forth two definitions for the term “child.”  Sec-
tion 453.015(1) defines “child”51 as “any person who has not attained the age 
of eighteen years or any person in the custody of the division of family ser-
vices who has not attained the age of twenty-one.”52  The definition from this 
section applies to Sections 453.010 to 453.400.53  Section 453.015 does not 
state whether it includes mentally incapacitated adults in its definition of 
“child.” 
The second definition for the term “child” appears in Section 453.090, 
which describes the legal inheritance rights of those adopted.  In this section, 
“child” means “either a person under or over the age of eighteen years.”54  
Section 453.090 expressly limits its definition of “child” to this section.55  
Section 453.090 focuses on the relationship between the parents and the 
adoptee when defining “child,” rather than focusing on the age of the adoptee. 
The exception to the consent requirement was added to Section 
453.030.2 in 1947.56  Before 1947, a general definitions statute had not yet 
been included in the adoption code, so Section 453.030.2’s use of “child” was 
not defined statutorily.57  The only definition of “child” in the adoption code 
was found in Section 453.090 and was limited to just that section.58 
While there is limited case law about this subject, the cases that have 
opined on the matter clarify that a mentally incapacitated adult can be includ-
ed in the definition of “child” within the adoption code.59  Missouri’s case 
law has defined “child” by focusing on the familial relationship between par-
ent and child, not the age of the adoptee.60 
 
 49. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030.2 (Supp. 2014). 
 50. Id. (emphasis added). 
 51. This section defines “minor” and “child” the same way.  See MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 453.015(1) (Supp. 2014). 
 52. Id. 
 53. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.015 (Supp. 2014).  Note that Section 453.030 is in-
cluded within the range of statutes to which this definition of “child” applies.  See id. 
 54. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.090.5 (Supp. 2014). 
 55. Id. 
 56. DeBrodie v. Martin, 400 S.W.3d 881, 886 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); see also MO. 
REV. STAT. § 453.030.2 (1947). 
 57. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 886. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. (citing State ex rel. Buerk v. Calhoun, 52 S.W.2d 742, 742 (Mo. 1932); In 
re Moran’s Estate, 52 S.W. 377, 378 (Mo. 1899)). 
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In 1932, State ex rel. Buerk v. Calhoun became the first case in Missouri 
to determine that the adoption code permitted an adult person to be adopted 
as the child of another person.61  In Buerk, the juvenile court dismissed the 
petition of a man trying to adopt an adult woman because the court held it 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.62  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri looked to the then-current adoption statute to make its determination.63  
Section 14073 included the phrase “desiring to adopt another person as his 
child.”64  This section did not mention an age limit or minority requirement.65  
Section 14074 included the phrasing “child or person.”66  The court held that 
Sections 14073 and 14074 “manifest[ed] the general intent that any person, 
regardless of age, may be adopted as the child of another person.”67 
A Missouri case from 1899, In re Moran, served as the basis for the 
court’s decision in Buerk.68  In Moran, David Moran and his then-wife Cathe-
rine adopted a twenty-two year old.69  David remarried when Catherine died, 
and his new wife brought suit to invalidate the adoption of the twenty-two 
year old when she was dividing David’s estate.70  The court held that the stat-
ute used the word child in the sense of its relation to the word parent and did 
not concern the age of the “child” being adopted.71  The court stated that 
“[t]he law has placed no limitation as to the age of the child to be adopted, 
and there is no reason why such a restriction should be placed on the choice 
of the adopting parent.”72 
B.  Best Interests of the Child Standard 
The “best interests of the child” standard is used in Missouri to deter-
mine whose custody a child should be in.73  Section 453.005.1 provides that 
adoption and foster care provisions “shall be construed so as to promote the 
best interests and welfare of the child in recognition of the entitlement of the 
 
 61. See State ex rel. Buerk v. Calhoun, 52 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Mo. 1932). 
 62. Id. at 742. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 14073 (1929)). 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 14074 (1929)). 
 67. Id. at 743. 
 68. Id. at 742 (citing In re Moran’s Estate, 52 S.W. 377 (Mo. 1899)). 
 69. In re Moran’s Estate, 52 S.W. at 377. 
 70. Id. at 377-78. 
 71. Id. at 378. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Lisa A. Brunner, Circumventing the “Best Interests of the Child” Stand-
ard: Child Custody Law in Missouri as Applied to Homosexual Parents, 55 J. MO. B. 
200, 201 (1999).  The article mainly discusses child custody in terms of dissolutions, 
but the same process of determining child custody occurs during adoptions.  See id. at 
200-01.  The scope of this Note is limited to adoption proceedings. 
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child to a permanent and stable home.”74  During these custody determination 
proceedings, the adoptee becomes a “ward[] of the court and the court steps 
in as parens partriae to represent [the adoptee’s] interests.”75 
In custody cases, the court considers several factors to determine which 
party will best serve the adoptee’s interests.76  When determining what would 
be in a child’s best interests, a court should consider a multitude of factors 
and no single factor is outcome-determinative.77  One court stated: 
The factors to be considered in determining what is in the best inter-
ests of the child are legion.  They vary from case to case.  It is impos-
sible to catalogue all the factors that may be involved.  It is virtually 
impossible to assign a degree of weight to specific favorable and un-
favorable factors.  With the exception of an extreme adverse factor, no 
single factor can be absolute.  Each case must be considered upon its 
own facts.78 
Some factors courts routinely consider when making the “best interests” 
determination are the overall home environment, the level of care the parents 
could provide the child, the stability of the home, the parenting skills of the 
proposed adoptive parent(s), a two-parent home with one parent being home 
for supervision, and a “bonding” between the potential custodial parents and 
the child.79  Specifically, courts have noted that attention directed toward the 
adoptee’s mental development and education,80 whether a parental relation-
ship between the adoptive parents and the child has already been estab-
lished,81 and the amount of time the adoptee was in the adoptive parents’ 
custody82 are important factors in a “best interests” determination.  Arguably 
the most significant factor in determining whether the adoption is in the best 
interests of the child is the degree of bonding between the custodial parents 
and the child.83 
Courts consider all relevant factors and look at the record as a whole 
when making these determinations.84  The court’s best interests of the child 
determination is based on the “totality of the circumstances.”85 
 
 74. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.005.1 (Supp. 2014). 
 75. Brunner, supra note 73, at 201. 
 76. See Brunner, supra note 73, at 200. 
 77. See M.F. v. D.A.H., 1 S.W.3d 524, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
 78. In re L.W.F., 818 S.W.2d 727, 734 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 79. See Adoption of T.E.B.R v. Aylward., 664 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1984); see also J.L.H. v. Juvenile Officer, 647 S.W.2d 852, 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); 
M.F., 1 S.W.3d at 533; Brunner, supra note 73, at 201-02. 
 80. See Adoption of T.E.B.R., 664 S.W.2d at 613. 
 81. Id. 
 82. M.F., 1 S.W.3d at 538. 
 83. See id. at 533. 
 84. See Brunner, supra note 73, at 202. 
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IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
On appeal, the Martins alleged the court erred in its interpretation of 
Missouri’s adoption statutes.86  The Martins argued that the adoption consent 
statute is ambiguous.87  Specifically, the Martins claimed the “statute is am-
biguous as to the consent required to adopt mentally incapacitated adults and 
that, to apply the statute constitutionally, [the appellate court] must interpret 
the statute as not requiring [DeBrodie] or [the] Legal Guardian’s consent.”88 
The Martins argued that the phrase “such child” in the second part of the 
sentence “refers back to ‘the person sought to be adopted [who] is fourteen 
years of age or older.’”89  Using this interpretation, the exception waives the 
consent requirement if the adoptee is fourteen years of age or older and is 
mentally incapacitated.90  However, the Legal Guardian contended the phrase 
“such child” refers to adoptees fourteen or older who also meet the adoption 
code’s definition of a “child.”91  This interpretation would mean that only a 
mentally incapacitated person between the ages of fourteen and seventeen 
years of age is considered a “child” within the meaning of the statute. 
A.  Defining “Child” for Adoption Purposes 
Chapter 453 contains two different definitions of “child” for adop-
tions.92  The first definition of “child” is found in Section 453.015.93  Section 
453.015 is a definitions statute that applies to Sections 453.010 to 453.400.94  
Section 453.015(1) states that the term “minor” or “child” refers to “any per-
son who has not attained the age of eighteen years or any person in the custo-
dy of the division of family services who has not attained the age of twenty-
one.”95  This definition of child is the narrower definition of the two in Chap-
ter 453.96  The second definition for “child” is found in Section 453.090.97  
Section 453.090 lays out the legal ramifications on inheritance rights for the 
adoptee.98  This section also uses a broader definition of the term “child,” but 
 
 85. In re H.N.S., 342 S.W.3d 344, 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (citing In re D.L.W., 
133 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)). 
 86. DeBrodie v. Martin, 400 S.W.3d 881, 884 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 87. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030 (Supp. 2012)). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 885 (quoting § 453.030.2) (alteration in original). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (citing § 453.030.2). 
 92. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 453.010, 453.090 (Supp. 2012)). 
 93. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.015 (2014). 
 94. Id. 
 95. § 453.015(1). 
 96. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 855 (citing § 453.015(1)). 
 97. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.090 (Supp. 2014). 
 98. Id. 
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that definition is limited just to this section.99  According to Section 453.090, 
“child” refers to “either a person under or over the age of eighteen years.”100 
The court had to determine which definition of “child” to use when in-
terpreting the adoption consent statute.101  The court stated Section 
453.090.5’s definition of “child” is expressly limited to that section, while 
Section 453.030 is within the range of statutes to which Section 453.015’s 
definition applies.102  The appellate court held that it would use the narrower 
definition of “child” in Section 453.015 when interpreting the adoption con-
sent statute.103 
When applying Sections 453.015’s definition of “child” to Section 
453.030.2’s exception to the consent requirement for adult adoptions, the 
court found “only those mentally incapacitated persons who are between the 
ages of fourteen through seventeen are exempt from the consent require-
ment.”104  The narrower definition of “child” does not allow mentally inca-
pacitated adults to fall within the exception to the consent requirement.105  
When using the plain language of Section 453.030.2, the section seems to 
require all adults, including those who are mentally incapacitated, to consent 
before they can be adopted.106 
The plain language interpretation of Section 453.030.2 “essentially dis-
qualifies from adoption mentally incapacitated adults like DeBrodie, who 
[are] presum[ptively] incompetent under Section 475.078.3107 and whom the 
court found to be incapable of consenting.”108  The Legal Guardian claimed 
the court should interpret the language of Section 453.030.2’s consent re-
quirement differently than the plain language appeared to require.109  The 
Legal Guardian argued the section should be inferred “as requiring either the 
 
 99. § 453.090.5. 
 100. Id. 
 101. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 885-86 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030 (Supp. 
2012)). 
 102. Id. at 886. 
 103. Id. at 885 (citing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 453.015, 453.030, 453.090 (Supp. 
2012)). 
 104. Id. (citing §§ 453.015, 453.030). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030.2 (Supp. 2014).  Section 475.078.3 
states, “A person who has been adjudicated incapacitated or disabled or both shall be 
presumed to be incompetent.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 475.078.3 (Supp. 2014).  Recall that 
the Circuit Court of Cole County found DeBrodie was “legally incapacitated and 
could not give his own consent . . . .  [And] there was no credible evidence to support 
a finding that DeBrodie understood the legal significance of a decision to consent to 
adoption.”  DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 883-84. 
 108. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 885. 
 109. Id. 
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adult adoptee’s consent or, if the adult adoptee is incapable of consenting, the 
consent of the adult adoptee’s legal guardian.”110 
The appellate court was not persuaded by the Legal Guardian’s argu-
ment.111  The court stated the plain language of Section 453.030.2 did not 
contain a provision for substituting the legal guardian’s consent for the men-
tally incapacitated adult adoptee’s consent.112  The court instead held that 
Section 453.030.2 was ambiguous as to the consent requirement for adult 
adoptees who are mentally incapacitated.113 
B.  Resolving the Ambiguity of “Child” in the Consent Exception 
The court stated that, “When construing an ambiguous statute, we ‘may 
review the earlier versions of the law, or examine the whole act to discern its 
evident purpose, or consider the problem the statute was enacted to reme-
dy.’”114  The statute should be read with other similarly related statutes when 
those related statutes help clarify the ambiguous statute’s meaning.115  The 
court presumes that “consistent statutes relating to the same subject matter are 
intended to be read consistently and harmoniously in their many parts.”116 
In its decision, the court considered that the exception to the consent re-
quirement was added to Section 453.030.2 in 1947.117  In 1947, a general 
definitions statute had not yet been included in the adoption code, so Section 
453.030.2’s use of the word “child” was not defined statutorily.118  The only 
definition of “child” in the adoption code was found in Section 453.090, but 
the definition was limited to just that section.119 
The court then looked to case law to interpret the term “child” in the 
adoption code.120  Case law had interpreted the word “child” to refer to the 
familial relationship between parent and child, not the age of the adoptee.121  
In both of the relevant cases to this issue, the court had ruled that Missouri’s 
adoption statutes allowed adult adoptions.122  In Buerk, the court held that 
 
 110. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 885-86. 
 114. Id. at 886 (quoting In re M.D.R., 124 S.W.3d 469, 472 (Mo. 2004) (en 
banc)). 
 115. Id. (citing BASF Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 392 S.W.3d 438, 444 (Mo. 2012) 
(en banc)). 
 116. Id. (citing BASF Corp., 392 S.W.3d at 444). 
 117. Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030.2 (Supp. 2014). 
 118. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 886. 
 119. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 453.090 (1949)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (citing State ex rel. Buerk v. Calhoun, 52 S.W.2d 742, 742 (Mo. 1932); In 
re Moran’s Estate, 52 S.W. 377, 378 (Mo. 1899)). 
 122. Id. (citing State ex rel. Buerk, 52 S.W.2d at 742-43; In re Moran’s Estate, 52 
S.W. at 377-78). 
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“the term ‘child’ in the adoption statutes is used in the sense of its relation to 
the word ‘parent,’ and does not signify minority.”123  
In 1982, the adoption code’s general definitional statute was enacted.124  
At its enactment, the term “child” was not included in the definitions statute; 
only the term “minor” was defined.125  The statute defined “minor” as a per-
son under eighteen years of age.126  Section 453.015(1) was amended in 1997 
to say that both “minor” and “child” referred to persons under eighteen.127  
The court then looked to other statues within the adoption code that in-
cluded adult adoptees in the definition of “child.”128  For example, Section 
453.010 lays out the venues for adoptions,129 and the court found that the 
term “child” in this section must include adult adoptees because it is in the 
only venue statute in the adoption code.130  The court then looked at Section 
453.080, which dictates what must be included in an adoption decree.131  The 
court stated, “[Section 453] is the only statutory provision concerning the 
contents of an adoption decree; therefore, it must apply to all adoptions, re-
gardless of the age of the adoptee.”132  Based on the analysis of the other stat-
utory sections, the court reasoned with regard to Section 453.090 – the sec-
tion in direct question in this case – that “because Section 453.090 provides 
that the consequences of adoption apply to minor and adult adoptees, it is 
reasonable that the legislature would require the court to declare the adoptee – 
regardless of the adoptee’s age – the ‘child’ for the petitioners for all legal 
intents and purposes, as the petitioners are now the adoptee’s ‘parents.’”133 
The final statute the court looked at was Section 453.170, which dis-
cusses Missouri’s recognition of out-of-state adoptions of “children” and has 
been interpreted to include both minors and adults.134  The court reasoned that 
because Missouri focuses on the parent-child relationship, and not the adopt-
ee’s age, “it would be illogical for the state to recognize only minor adoptions 
and not adult adoptions from other states and foreign countries.”135 
The court ultimately held that the term “child” in Section 453.030.2’s 
exception to the consent requirement refers to both mentally incapacitated 
 
 123. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Buerk, 52 S.W.2d at 742) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 124. Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 453.015(1) (Supp. 1982). 
 125. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 886; see also § 453.015(1). 
 126. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 886; see also § 453.015(1). 
 127. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 886; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 453.015(1) (Supp. 
1997). 
 128. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 886. 
 129. See MO. REV. STAT. § 453.010 (Supp. 2014). 
 130. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 886. 
 131. See MO. REV. STAT. § 453.080.3 (Supp. 2014). 
 132. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 887. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 453.170 (Supp. 2012)). 
 135. Id. 
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minors and mentally incapacitated adults.136  The court concluded that Mis-
souri Revised Statutes Sections 453.010, 453.080.3, and 453.170 include 
adult adoptees in the definition of “child,” even though those sections are 
included in the range of statutes to which Section 453.015(1)’s under-
eighteen definition of “child” clearly applies.137  The court stated that this 
interpretation “furthers the adoption code’s purpose of allowing both minors 
and adults to be adopted and to receive the benefits of being adopted.”138  The 
court noted that restricting the term “child” to include only mentally incapaci-
tated minors would produce an “absurd” result:139 it would effectively pre-
vent mentally incapacitated adults incapable of giving consent from being 
adopted.140 
C.  Legal Guardian’s Consent Is Not a Substitute for Mentally        
Incapacitated Adult Adoptee’s Consent 
The Legal Guardian argued that the court could avoid an “absurd” result 
by interpreting Section 453.030.2 to require the legal guardian’s consent as a 
substitute for the mentally incapacitated adult’s consent.141  The court found 
no support for this interpretation, neither explicitly nor implicitly, in the 
adoption code.142  The court also stated that requiring the legal guardian’s 
consent in order for the court to proceed on an adoption petition was contrary 
to Section 453.060.4.143 
Section 453.060.4 provides that “so long as all of the required parties 
listed [in] Section 453.060.1 have been served, the court can act on [any] 
adoption petition without the consent of any party except that of a parent 
where the adoptee is a minor.”144  According to Section 453.060.1, the legal 
guardian must be served with the adoption petition,145 but Section 453.060.4 
does not require the legal guardian’s consent before the court can proceed 
with the adoption petition.146  The court stated that the “implication of Sec-
tion 453.060.4 is that the decision as to whether an adoption should be grant-
ed does not rest upon the consent of the adoptee’s legal guardian.  Rather, this 
decision rests upon the court’s determination that the adoption would be in 
the adoptee’s best interests.”147 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 453.010, .015(1), .080.3, .170 (Supp. 2012)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 453.060.4 (Supp. 2012)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 888 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 453.060.1 (Supp. 2012)). 
 146. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 453.060.4 (Supp. 2012)). 
 147. Id. 
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss1/8
2015] CONSENT NOT REQUIRED 185 
The court stated that the Supreme Court of Missouri had recognized that 
in adoption statutes, the court’s determination about the “best interests of the 
adoptee” trumped the “legal guardian’s decision to give or refuse consent.”148  
The importance of the court’s “best interests of the adoptee” determination 
was apparent from the statutory power the legislature had expressly granted 
to the juvenile court in adoption proceedings.149  Section 211.031.1(4) grant-
ed the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings.150  
Section 453.030.1 allowed the court to give or withhold its approval for an 
adoption “as the welfare of the person sought to be adopted may, in the opin-
ion of the court, demand.”151 
Ultimately, the court determined that “[i]n light of the adoption code as 
a whole, its history, and its purpose,” Section 453.030.2’s language152 re-
quires written consent in all cases.153  However, the court found that written 
consent is not required where the proposed adoptee is fourteen years of age or 
older and “‘where the court finds that such child has not sufficient mental 
capacity to give [consent]’”; this interpretation excepts “from the consent 
requirement all mentally incapacitated persons age fourteen and older whom 
the court has found to be unable to give consent.”154  The court would not 
construe the adoption code to require the legal guardian’s consent for adop-
tion;155 the legal guardian is entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard, but 
the legislature entrusted the court, not the legal guardian, to make the “best 
interests of the adoptee” determination.156 
The court held the circuit court erred in finding that DeBrodie’s consent 
or the Legal Guardian’s consent was required before the court could proceed 
with the adoption petition.157  The Cole County Circuit Court erred because it 
 
 148. Id. (citing Duren v. Hicks, 200 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Mo. 1947) (en banc)).  In 
Duren v. Hicks, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the court would be “a 
mere figurehead with no authority or discretion” unless the court made the decision 
that the adoption was in the best interests of the child.  200 S.W.2d at 347.  The court 
in Duren further stated that the legal guardian is “entitled to notice, and to appear, 
dissent and defend in the adoption proceeding, yet he cannot control it.”  Id.  The 
appellate court in the present case determined that “based on the 1939 statutes, Du-
ren’s reasoning [was] equally applicable to the current version of the adoption stat-
utes.”  DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 889. 
 149. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 888. 
 150. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031.1(4) (Supp. 2012)).  The statute granted 
family courts exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings in circuits that have a 
family court.  Id. 
 151. Id. at 889 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030.1 (Supp. 2012)) (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 152. The court was specifically referring to the language: “The written consent . . . 
to give the same.” 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
13
Collins: Consent not Required: Missouri’s Adoption Laws for Incapacitated
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
186 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
did not hold that DeBrodie fell under the consent exception requirement for 
adoption and held that either DeBrodie or the Legal Guardian was required to 
give consent for DeBrodie’s adoption.158  The appellate court, therefore, re-
versed the judgment denying the Martins’ adoption petition and remanded the 
case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, including the deter-
mination of whether the adoption was in DeBrodie’s best interests.159 
V.  COMMENT 
The appellate court correctly held that Section 453.030.2 was ambigu-
ous as to the consent requirement for mentally incapacitated adult adoptees 
and that the statute’s exception for the consent requirement should apply to 
mentally incapacitated adult adoptees.  The definition of “child” applicable to 
Section 453.030 states that a child is someone who is not yet eighteen years 
of age.160  When applying that definition to Section 453.030’s exception to 
consent, only mentally incapacitated persons who are between fourteen and 
seventeen years of age are exempt from the consent requirement.  Thus, 
seemingly, according to the statute, consent would be required for all mental-
ly incapacitated persons being adopted.  This interpretation would require the 
consent of all adults, even mentally incapacitated adults, before they could be 
adopted.  This interpretation, if adopted by other circuits in Missouri, would 
effectively disqualify any mentally incapacitated adults from adoption, which 
is an unjust outcome. 
The appellate court here correctly interpreted the term “child” to refer to 
minor and adult adoptees.  The appellate court found the adoption code’s 
purpose was to allow adoptees to receive the benefits of being adopted.161  
The adoption code’s purpose would not be furthered unless both minors and 
adults could be adopted and receive the benefits of adoption.162 
The appellate court then correctly applied its interpretation of “child” to 
Section 453.030.2’s exception to the consent requirement when it determined 
the exception applies to mentally incapacitated adults as well.163  This inter-
pretation also furthers the adoption code’s purpose.  By not requiring the con-
sent of mentally incapacitated adults, the appellate court permitted mentally 
incapacitated adults to become members of loving families.  Mentally inca-
pacitated adults deserve a chance to receive the benefits of adoption, just as 
mentally incapacitated minors do. 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 889-90. 
 160. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.015(1) (Supp. 2013). 
 161. DeBrodie, 400 S.W.3d at 887. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. at 885. 
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A.  On Remand and Re-Appeal: In re Adoption of DeBrodie 
After being remanded to the circuit court, the case was re-appealed to 
the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.164  In the original adoption 
proceeding, the circuit court denied the Martins’ petition to adopt DeBro-
die.165  The original appellate opinion, DeBrodie v. Martin, remanded the 
case back to the circuit court “to consider the fitness and propriety of the 
adoption.”166  On remand, the circuit court once again denied the Martins’ 
petition for adoption.167  The court held that the Martins “failed to establish 
by clear and convincing evidence the fitness or propriety of the adoption or 
that the welfare of [DeBrodie] demanded that the adoption be granted.”168 
In the second appeal, the Martins argued two points.  First, that the cir-
cuit court erred by requiring the standard of proof to be clear and convincing 
evidence.169  The Martins asserted the correct standard of proof was prepon-
derance of the evidence and that the adoption was in the best interest of the 
adoptee.170  The Martins argued that preponderance of the evidence was the 
correct standard of proof because grounds for termination of parental rights 
are not an issue in adult adoption cases.171  Since termination of parental 
rights is not an issue, parental consent and joinder of a parent as a party are 
not required, meaning a lower standard of proof is appropriate.172 
Second, the Martins asserted that the circuit court erred in denying the 
adoption because the court “misapplied the adoption law to the evidence and 
its own findings.”173  The circuit court held that the Martins did not prove that 
DeBrodie’s welfare demanded that the Martins’ adoption petition be grant-
ed.174  The court found this even though the Martins argued that the circuit 
court previously “found the Martins fit to be adoptive parents, to clearly have 
a significant relationship with and affection for [DeBrodie], and to be more 
than willing to advocate for him.”175 
 
 164. In re Adoption of DeBrodie, No. WD 77236, 2014 WL 5462289 (Mo. Ct. 
App. Oct. 28, 2014), reh’g and/or transfer denied (Nov. 25, 2014), transfer denied 
(Feb. 3, 2015). 
 165. Id. at *1. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. (emphasis added). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (emphasis added). 
 175. Id. at *5. 
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B.  The Appellate Court Erred in Affirming a New Heightened    
Standard for Termination of Parental Rights in Adoption Cases      
Involving Mentally Incapacitated Adults 
On the second appeal, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s 
judgment requiring clear and convincing evidence that DeBrodie’s adoption 
would be fit and proper.176  The appellate court held the Martins were re-
quired to rebut a presumption that favors familial bonds by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.  Then – if that presumption was rebutted – the Martins were 
required to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that permanent sever-
ance of the legal parent-child relationship was in DeBrodie’s best interest.177  
The effect of the court’s decision was that DeBrodie was deprived of the op-
portunity to leave institutionalization and to be adopted by a loving family. 
On remand, the circuit court was to “consider other evidence to ensure 
the propriety of the adoption.”178  The inquiry into whether the adoption was 
in the best interests of DeBrodie, using a preponderance of the evidence 
standard of proof, should have provided sufficient evidence; instead, the cir-
cuit court decided that a heightened burden of proof was required for the fit-
ness and/or propriety determination.179  The appellate court held that justice 
required a heightened standard of proof for the termination of parental rights 
for mentally incapacitated adoptees.180  By applying this heightened standard 
only to situations involving mentally incapacitated adult adoptees, the court 
may have run afoul of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the 
Equal Protection Clause.  This leads to a harsh result for all mentally incapac-
itated adults with prior foster parents who want to adopt them. 
The appellate court relied heavily on one case, Santosky v. Kramer.181  
This case concerned termination of parental rights of a minor rather than an 
adoption, which was the primary concern in the present case.  Different 
standards of proof are required in each proceeding.  In a termination of paren-
tal rights case involving a minor child, the burden of proof is clear and con-
vincing evidence, which is a heightened standard.  In an adoption case, the 
standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence that the adoption is in the 
“best interests” of the adoptee. 
A heightened burden of proof for termination of parental rights in all 
adult adoption cases is inconsistent with Missouri law.  Raising the burden is 
unnecessary and inhibitory to the adult adoption process.  Missouri law re-
quires clear and convincing evidence before terminating parental rights for 
children182 and a determination by the trial court that termination of parental 
 
 176. Id. at *1. 
 177. Id. at *2. 
 178. Id. at *8. 
 179. Id. at *2-3. 
 180. Id. at *2. 
 181. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 182. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.6 (Supp. 2014) (emphasis added). 
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rights is in the best interest of the minor child.183  While the legal relationship 
between the biological child and parent is severed in an adoption, the same 
concerns that exist in a termination of parental rights proceeding do not exist 
in an adult adoption proceeding.184   
In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the juvenile court has ju-
risdiction and its determination to terminate severs the legal relationship be-
tween the biological child and parent.185  The juvenile court must determine 
that grounds exist for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing 
evidence.186  If that standard is met, the court has to find that the termination 
is in the best interests of the child.187  In this proceeding, the primary purpose 
for terminating a biological parent’s parental rights is to free the child for 
adoption.188  In termination of parental rights proceedings, there is a strong 
presumption that favors avoiding the severance of the parent-child relation-
ship.189 
In its second consideration of DeBrodie, the circuit court required a 
clear and convincing standard of proof for terminating parental rights in 
adoptions of adults who cannot consent due to legal incapacity.190  DeBrodie 
is neither a child191 nor a minor,192 so this heightened standard of proof 
should not apply to his adoption.193  The appellate court expanded the defini-
tion of “child” in the adoption code to include adult adoptees, but did not 
expand the definition to include adult adoptees in termination of parental 
right cases.  As an adult, the main concern for severing the biological parent-
child relationship would be its effect on the adoptee’s inheritance rights.  
DeBrodie would no longer be able to inherit from his biological mother, but 
 
 183. In re J.M.T., 386 S.W.3d 152, 158 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added). 
 184. Inheritance rights are a concern, but maintaining a parent-child relationship 
and keeping the family unit together are not concerns.  Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 
453.090.2 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 185. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.6 (Supp. 2014). 
 186. Id. 
 187. In re B.H., 348 S.W.3d 770, 776 (Mo. 2011) (en banc).  When DeBrodie was 
a minor, his mother’s parental rights could have been terminated, but the court did not 
terminate them at the time.  DeBrodie v. Martin, 400 S.W.3d 881, 883 & n.1 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2013).  The court found termination of the mother’s parental rights was not in 
the best interests of the children at the time.  Id. at 883 n.1. 
 188. 21 Mo. Prac., Family Law § 17:12 (3d ed.).   
 189. In re B.H., 348 S.W.3d at 776. 
 190. In re Adoption of DeBrodie, No. WD 77236, 2014 WL 5462289, at *1-2 
(Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2014), reh’g and/or transfer denied (Nov. 25, 2014), transfer 
denied (Feb. 3, 2015). 
 191. A child is “an individual under eighteen years of age.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 
211.442(1) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 192. A minor is “any person who has not attained the age of eighteen years.”  § 
211.422(2). 
 193. DeBrodie was thirteen years-old in September 1999.  DeBrodie v. Martin, 
400 S.W.3d 881, 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).  DeBrodie was approximately twenty-
eight years old at the time of the second appeal. 
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instead would inherit from the Martins.194  Since DeBrodie is an adult, there 
should not be a strong presumption favoring preservation of the legal rela-
tionship between DeBrodie and his mother.  The relevant inquiry should have 
been whether the permanent severance of the parent-child bond was in 
DeBrodie’s best interest.195  This inquiry only requires a preponderance of the 
evidence standard of proof.196 
The appellate court’s decision will have a discriminatory impact on 
adoptions of mentally incapacitated adults.  For adoptions of adults with ca-
pacity, the court does not require clear and convincing evidence supporting 
the termination of parental rights.  This is because an adult adoptee who has 
capacity can consent to the adoption and the adoption can proceed to the best 
interests determination.  A mentally incapacitated adult does not have that 
same luxury. 
Mentally incapacitated adults are entitled to “equal rights and opportuni-
ty under the law.”197  These rights and opportunities include the right to be a 
member of a loving family through adoption.  Disabled Americans have a 
right to not be discriminated against through overprotective rules and poli-
cies.198  This decision acts as a back-door way to discriminate against mental-
ly incapacitated adults because it obstructs their potential adoptions.  While 
the court likely did not intend this result, the appellate court’s decision now 
will inhibit and negatively impact adoptions of mentally incapacitated adults.  
Based on the appellate court’s decision, a potential adoptive family of a men-
tally incapacitated adult has to rebut a strong presumption favoring preserv-
ing familial bonds by a heightened proof standard, clear and convincing evi-
dence.  Then the family would have to demonstrate the adoption was in the 
best interests of the mentally incapacitated adult adoptee.  If that same poten-
tial family were to petition to adopt an adult with capacity, that family would 
not have to rebut any strong presumptions by clear and convincing evidence.  
The family would solely have to demonstrate the adoption was in the best 
interests by a preponderance of the evidence.  
This extra “hoop” that potential adoptive families have to jump through 
is unnecessary.  Under a lesser burden, the court would still be able to take an 
active role in ensuring the adoption would benefit the mentally incapacitated 
adult adoptee.  The court would still consider all the relevant evidence sur-
 
 194. See MO. REV. STAT. § 453.090.2 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (detailing inheritance 
rights of adoptees).  
 195. See In re B.H., 348 S.W.3d 770, 776 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). 
 196. Id. 
 197. MO. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).  In Mayernik v. 
Ambrogio, the court held that the parent consent sections of the adoption code did not 
violate the U.S. Constitution or Article One of the Missouri Constitution.  292 S.W.2d 
562 (Mo. 1956).  Mayernik is distinguishable from DeBrodie because DeBrodie deals 
with an adult adoption, because parental consent was not an issue in DeBrodie, and 
because DeBrodie does not deal with the revocation of written consent and/or the 
constitutionality of written consent. 
 198. §12101(a)(5). 
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rounding the adoption when making its “best interests” determination.  In-
deed, a potential adoptive family must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the adoption is in the best interest of the mentally incapacitated 
adult adoptee.  A preponderance standard for both inquiries would not impose 
additional burdens on adults incapable of consenting, and therefore it would 
not run afoul of the ADA or the Equal Protection Clause.199  Such a standard 
would not be “overprotective” and would ensure that mentally incapacitated 
adults are afforded the opportunity to be adopted by stable, loving families, if 
a court determines that the adoption would be in their best interests. 
C.  The Circuit Court Erred in Determining the Martins Failed to 
Prove DeBrodie’s Welfare Demanded He Be Adopted by the Martins 
The circuit court previously “found the Martins fit to be adoptive par-
ents, to clearly have a significant relationship with and affection for [DeBro-
die], and to be more than willing to advocate for him.”200  However, the cir-
cuit court, on remand, found the Martins did not prove that DeBrodie’s wel-
fare demanded that the Martins’ adoption petition be granted.201  No evidence 
was presented to discredit the circuit court’s earlier findings.  Unfortunately, 
the circuit court was hyper-focused on certain issues and did not give enough 
weight to other issues and explanations present in this case, which colored the 
court’s judgment when it determined that the evidence did not demand the 
adoption be granted. 
The county staff members who testified had various concerns about 
DeBrodie leaving institutionalized care to live with the Martin family.  The 
staff members favored keeping DeBrodie in institutionalized care, rather than 
him becoming a member of the Martin family.  The staff members’ opinions 
appear to have been based on inaccurate information.  The court seemed to 
give their testimony great weight, while giving less weight to other important 
considerations. 
One staff member was concerned about a particular visit that occurred at 
the Martins’ residence.202  The staff member claimed that DeBrodie returned 
to institutionalized care with a lighter and cigarette in his pocket after a doc-
tor ordered that he quit smoking for his own safety.203  The staff member also 
claimed that DeBrodie returned to institutionalized care with a full adult dia-
per that had been full for some time.204  The Martins stated that DeBrodie was 
 
 199. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; MO. CONST. art. I, § 2; § 12101.  The ADA 
states that “individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of dis-
crimination including . . . overprotective rules and policies.”  §12101(a)(5). 
 200. In re Adoption of DeBrodie, No. WD 77236, 2014 WL 5462289, at *5 (Mo. 
Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2014), reh’g and/or transfer denied (Nov. 25, 2014), transfer de-
nied (Feb. 3, 2015). 
 201. Id. at *8 (emphasis added). 
 202. Id. at *6. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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under constant supervision except for one brief bathroom break.205  Accord-
ing to the Martins, when DeBrodie left the Martins’ home after that visit, he 
did not smell of feces and showed no sign of having a lighter and/or ciga-
rette.206  The record does not indicate that the car smelled of feces during the 
trip from the Martins back to Second Chance.  That same staff member re-
ported the smell and contraband to the Legal Guardian when DeBrodie re-
turned to Second Chance.  The staff member was unaware of an e-mail from 
the Martins’ attorney, who had returned DeBrodie to the institution, sent to 
the Legal Guardian the day after the visit, which explained the circumstances 
of DeBrodie’s return to Second Chance.207  The staff member had incomplete 
information when forming her opinion.208 
The court’s opinion also did not ease concern of potential bias that like-
ly existed in the opinions of the Legal Guardian on DeBrodie’s placement.  
The Legal Guardian’s deputy was working at Second Chance while working 
as a deputy to the Callaway County public administrator, which is a notewor-
thy conflict of interest.209  The deputy was very much in favor of keeping 
DeBrodie institutionalized, but did not know important things about DeBro-
die, which raises concerns about her opinion.  For example, the deputy stated 
that DeBrodie had autism and that it was diagnosed at birth.210  DeBrodie is 
not autistic, and even if he were, the diagnosis could not have occurred at 
birth.211  A mentally incapacitated person’s diagnosis is an important fact to 
be aware of, especially when deciding if institutionalization is the most ap-
propriate option. 
The appellate court also focused on the fact that the adoption would 
sever ties between DeBrodie and his biological mother.212  In every adoption, 
further contact between the adoptee and biological parent(s) is at the discre-
tion of the adoptive parents.213  A court is not able to guarantee continued 
contact between adoptees and their biological parent(s), and the appellate 
court was particularly concerned in this case.214 
The appellate court stated that the Martins had not visited DeBrodie in 
two years.215  The court did not include the fact that, according to the Martins, 
DeBrodie’s Legal Guardian did not allow him to have visits with or com-
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municate with the Martins.216  The court noted that the Legal Guardian al-
lowed the Martins to have supervised visits with DeBrodie.217  The Martins 
regularly visited DeBrodie after he was an adult and no longer in their care up 
until the first guardianship petition, when tensions between the Martins and 
the Legal Guardian increased.218  The Martins were unable to visit with 
DeBrodie as they normally did after Mrs. Martin “hot lined” Second Chance 
for abuse.219  The appellate court found that it was not improper for the circuit 
court to have considered that the Martins engaged in continued disputes with 
the Legal Guardian and that those disputes did not advance DeBrodie’s inter-
ests.220  The appellate court thought it was relevant to consider “whether 
adoption by the Martins was in [DeBrodie]’s best interest where the prospec-
tive adoptive parents have a strained relationship with [DeBrodie]’s legal 
guardian.”221  The court recognized that continued disputes between the Mar-
tins and Legal Guardian did not advance DeBrodie’s interests, but then held 
lack of visits (and lack of increased conflict) against the Martins.222 
The court also drew attention to one comment Mrs. Martin made about 
DeBrodie’s mother being difficult to deal with.223  According to the Martins’ 
brief, DeBrodie’s mother was a “severely intellectually, psychologically, 
socially and occupationally impaired person.”224  The biological mother’s 
testing scores indicated that she has mental limitations.225  Such limitations 
may have contributed to misunderstandings and disputes, but Mrs. Martin’s 
comment does not negate the other evidence demonstrating that the Martins 
would continue to facilitate a relationship between DeBrodie and his biologi-
cal mother. 
Indeed, the court did not give enough weight to other evidence that was 
presented.  The Martins had two other foster children with family in Callaway 
County, the same area where DeBrodie’s mother lived.226  Although the Mar-
tins had to move away for family reasons, Mrs. Martin regularly brought the 
two other foster children back to Callaway County to see their biological 
parents.227  DeBrodie looked forward to his mother’s visits, but due to trans-
portation issues she was unable to make many visits, which greatly upset him 
and caused him to act out.228  These transportation issues would have been 
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 219. In re Adoption of DeBrodie, 2014 WL 5462289, at *7.  Several hot line calls 
were made by the Martins and DeBrodie’s biological mother.  Id. 
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greatly reduced, if not eliminated, if the adoption had been granted.  Mrs. 
Martin still communicates with DeBrodie’s mother regarding the adoption 
and concerns over DeBrodie’s condition at Second Chance.229 
Several witnesses testified that DeBrodie appeared to be doing better at 
Second Chance after leaving his biological mother’s home.230  DeBrodie was 
living with his biological mother prior to being sent to live at an institution.231  
DeBrodie’s biological mother was not a proper caregiver for him.  She previ-
ously could have had her parental rights terminated232 and has mental defi-
ciencies that would impede her ability to be an appropriate caregiver for 
DeBrodie, a mentally incapacitated adult.233  It would be expected that as 
soon as DeBrodie was at an appropriate placement there would be a “tremen-
dous positive change” in him.234  If DeBrodie had been placed with the Mar-
tins instead of Second Chance after leaving his mother’s care, the same “tre-
mendous positive” change would have likely occurred. 
One of the most concerning issues the court did not fully address was 
the effect institutionalization has had on DeBrodie.  County staff members 
testified his condition had improved after he was removed from his mentally 
incapacitated mother’s care.  Once DeBrodie was institutionalized, he re-
ceived significant amounts of medication and started wearing adult diapers.235  
DeBrodie did not require a single medication while with the Martins, but after 
institutionalization he was heavily medicated to the point he was lethargic.236  
DeBrodie never needed to wear adult diapers when in the custody and care of 
the Martins. 237   
Finally, the circuit court did not consider DeBrodie’s full statements 
when taking his wishes on placement into account.  The circuit court found 
there was evidence that DeBrodie said he wanted to live “here” at both Sec-
ond Chance and the Martins’ house.238  According to the G.A.L. Investigation 
Report, when DeBrodie was asked where he wanted to live (while he was at 
the Martins) he said, “Here. Home.”239  Then, when DeBrodie was asked 
about previously stating he wanted to live at Second Chance, DeBrodie clari-
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fied he wanted to live “here” (at the Martins).240  He shook his head “no” 
when asked about living at Second Chance.241 
The circuit court had broad authority when determining whether to ap-
prove or deny the Martins’ adoption petition.  The appellate court was limited 
to overturning the circuit court’s decision if the decision was “against the 
weight of the evidence,” which it was not.242  There were many facts for and 
against both parties.  The circuit court did not appear to consider all of the 
evidence available when determining the fitness and/or propriety of the adop-
tion.  The circuit court was hyper-focused on small pieces of information and 
did not look at the big picture.  The circuit court favored keeping DeBrodie in 
an institutional setting in the same county instead of giving him a chance to 
be a legal part of his former foster parents’ family, and there was little the 
appellate court could do to right a wrong decision. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The appellate court was wrong to impose a heightened proof standard in 
termination of parental rights cases for prospective adult adoptees who lack 
capacity.  The heightened standard will interfere with adoptions of mentally 
incapacitated adults.  Finding adoptive parents for mentally incapacitated 
persons is a difficult task, and the potential adoptee in this case, DeBrodie, 
had his loving, previous foster family who wanted to adopt him.  The height-
ened standard requires potential adoptive families to jump through an extra 
“hoop,” but only for adoptions of mentally incapacitated adults; the families 
do not have to jump through an extra “hoop” if they are adopting an adult 
who has the capacity to consent to the adoption.   
Additionally, the circuit court never reversed its earlier determination 
that the Martins were fit adoptive parents for DeBrodie.  The court should not 
have required the Martins to present evidence that DeBrodie’s welfare de-
manded the court approve the adoption  The circuit court was hyper-focused 
on minor issues and brushed aside important facts and explanations, likely 
affecting the outcome.  Then, the appellate court was not in a position to re-
verse the circuit court’s decision to deny the adoption petition. 
The result of this case seems unjust.  The Martins were a part of DeBro-
die’s life for many years.  The Martins cared about DeBrodie and loved him 
as their own.  After reading all of the facts, including the facts in the appellate 
briefs, it appears the circuit court had enough evidence to determine it was 
appropriate to grant the adoption.243  Now, DeBrodie will have to spend the 
rest of his life in an institution instead of having a chance to be a member of 
his loving, former foster family. 
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